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Artimez: Commercial Law

COMMERCIAL LAW
I.

WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT

Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1982).
Following a modern trend in many American jurisdictions to increase the
personal liability of corporate officers,1 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, in Mullins v. Venable,2 held that a corporate officer can be personally liable to the employees of the corporation for wages, fringe benefits,
and liquidated damages, when the officer knowingly permits the corporation
to violate provisions of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act.'
Mullins followed the 1981 decision of Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp.,4 in which
the court also interpreted several provisions of the Wage Payment and Collection Act. Both cases reveal a general expansive attitude by the court in interpreting the Act to protect the wage earner. In Farley,the court expanded
the reach of the Act beyond the exclusive employer-employee relationship.5
The Act's liability provisions were held to encompass the corporation which
had hired the workers' employer as a general contractor.' In Mullins, the
court continued this expansion, holding that a corporate officer can be perSee Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers for Debts of Financially Troubled Corporations, 81 CoM. L.J. 389 (1976) (In addition to traditional legal liability for fraud against the company or stockholders, or for negligence regarding the corporation's assets, the trend is to make
corporate directors responsible to creditors); McAdams & Tower, PersonalAccountability in the
Corporate Sector, 16 Am. Bus. L.J. 67 (1978) (Legislative and judicial movement toward personal
accountability, as illustrated in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), generally has expanded
in public welfare areas); Shaneyfelt, The PersonalLiability Maze of Corporate Directors and Officers, 58 NEB. L. REV. 692 (1979) (Increased personal liability of directors and officers for improper actions taken in the corporate name is discussed regarding shareholder derivative suits,
third-party actions under federal law, the Nebraska Business Corporation Act, and Nebraska common law). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 39m-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (Wage Payment and
Collection Act holds officers of a corporation who knowingly permit an employer to violate the
Act as the employers of the employees for purposes of liability under the Act); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-323(b) (1981) (Labor and Industries statute holds any officer having management of the corporation as the employer for purposes of the Act where the officer knowingly permits the corporation to engage in violations of the statute); NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.010 (1979) (Wage and Hour
Regulation statute defines employer as "every person, firm, corporation ....
agent, manager,
representative or other person having control or custody of any employment . . . or any
employee"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-IA (1978) (Under Payment of Wages statute, employer definition includes any agent or officer of a corporation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-11-110(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1981) (Under Labor and Employment statute employer defined to include any agent or officer of a corporation).
2 Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va. 1982).
W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -16 (1981).
281 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981). Employees filed suit for unpaid wages against the corporation
which had hired their employer as a general contractor. The court held that a lien for liquidated
damages, through the terms of W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4 of the Wage Payment and Collection Act,
could be enforced against the corporation pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 38-2-31 which provides for a
mechanic's lien for unpaid value of work performed.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
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sonally liable to an employee-wage earner when he knowingly permits illegal
acts by the employer-corporation.
The appellants in Mullins were thirteen former employees of Venable
and Billups Corporation, a coal mining enterprise which had ceased operation.' Venable and Billups Corporation subcontracted the operation from
Olentangy, Ltd., an Ohio limited partnership.' The workers, who were owed
approximately two weeks of wages and other fringe benefits, were not paid
on the next regular payday as is required by the Act." Appellants filed suit
to recover their wages, fringe benefits, and liquidated damages. In addition,
the appellants sought to hold the corporate president, James T. Venable, personally liable for knowingly acquiescing in the corporation's failure to pay its
employees' wages.1
In Mullins, the trial court had granted the appellee's motion to dismiss,
ruling that the Wage Payment and Collection Act did not authorize a liability
action against a corporate officer in his personal capacity. 2 The supreme
court, however, in an opinion written by Justice McGraw, reversed that decision, holding that corporate officers have a duty to see that their corporation
obeys the law. 3 As in Farley,4 the court recognized the Act as remedial legislation, stating that the goal of the legislation is to protect working people and
assist them in collecting wrongfully withheld compensation. 5
Appellee Venable made several arguments before the court, contending
that he should not be held personally liable. He first argued that the language of the statutory provisions of the Act did not subject officers of a corporation to liability.' The court examined the phrase, "person, firm, or corporation," as used throughout the Act, and stressed the language of West
Virginia Code section 21-5-1(h) 7 in refuting the appellee's argument. The
court recognized both the comprehensive nature of the Act as well as the legislative intent to "impose personal liability on corporate officers who knowingly permit violations of the Act."' 8 Since a corporation is an artificial or jur297 S.E.2d at 868.
'Id.
Id. at 871 n.3.
o Id. at 868; W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(c) (1981) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever an
employee quits or resigns, the person, firm or corporation shall pay the employee's wages no later
than the next regular payday ......
11 297 S.E.2d at 868.

"Id. at 869.
'3

Id. at 872.

281 S.E.2d at 244.
297 S.E.2d at 869.
18

Id.

W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(h) (1981) provides in pertinent part: "The term 'officer' shall include
officers or agents in the management of a corporation or firm, who knowingly permits the corporation or firm to violate the provisions of this article."
" 297 S.E.2d at 869-70.
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istic creation which acts solely through its corporate officers or agents, the
court maintained that responsibility for a corporation's actions must ultimately fall upon the persons acting for the corporation, that is the corporate
officers.' 9 In addition, the court stressed the intent of the Legislature, as evidenced by the enactment of the Wage Payment and Collection Act, to prevent corporate officers from escaping liability for their "unlawful mischief"
by hiding behind the "corporate skirt."'"
Second, Venable argued that obtaining a judgment against the corporation, along with an unsatisfied return of execution on that judgment, should
be conditions precedent to maintaining an action against him personally.2'
The court rejected this argument, maintaining that the Act "does not create
a suretyship relationship between the corporation and its officers with respect to unsatisfied wage claims."' Instead, the court recognized a "quasipublic" duty placed upon corporate officers by the Legislature in enacting
the Wage Payment and Collection Act."3 This duty was found consistent with
the general duty of corporate officers to see that their corporation obeys the
law." The court viewed the imposition of a "quasi-public" duty upon corporate officers as furthering the important public policy of insuring that
employers pay the wages of their workers.' Since the liability of corporate
officers under the Act was determined to be direct and absolute, the court
held that it was not necessary for corporate employees to obtain a judgment
against the corporation prior to maintaining an action against a corporate officer who knowingly permits the corporation to violate the Act. 6
The court likewise rejected the appellee's third argument that all remedies should be exhausted against the prime contractor, Olentangy, Ltd., before proceeding against the subcontractor.' Although the court found that
West Virginia Code section 21-5-7' states that a prime contractor may be
held liable for wages which the subcontractor does not pay, the Code section

,9Id. at 869.

Id. at 870.
2!

Id.

"Id. at 871.
2 Id.
24

Id.

2 Id.

Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 871-72.
23 W. VA. CODE § 21-5-7 (1981) provides in part:
Whenever any person, firm or corporation shall contract with another for the performance of any work which the prime contracting person has undertaken to perform for
another, the prime contractor shall become civilly liable to employees engaged in the
performance of work under such contract for the payment of wages and fringe benefits,
exclusive of liquidated damages ... to the extent that the employer of such employee
fails to pay such wages and fringe benefits: Provided, that such employees have exhausted all feasible remedies contained in this article against such employer ....
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also specifically instructs that all other feasible remedies under the Act must
be taken before an employee can proceed against the prime contractor.29
Finally, Venable argued that the Act as applied was unconstitutional, as
it represented a taking of his property without due process of law.'* He asserted that under the corporation's contract with the prime contractor, the
prime contractor was to provide the payroll so that he could pay the
workers2 Venable contended that holding him liable for the prime contractor's wrong amounted to strict liability.2 The court did not find the appellee's constitutional argument convincing. It stressed that the Act only
subjects personal liability to those corporate officers who knowingly permit
the corporation to violate the law.' If at retrial appellee Venable is adjudged
not to have knowingly permitted the corporation's illegal acts, then he would
not be personally liable.' Further, the court held that the legislation itself
was clearly within the police powers of the state, since it was "neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and ...designed to further a legitimate and important public purpose." 5 In addition, the court noted that at trial Venable could
assert his claim against the prime contractor if he so desired.
This interpretation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection
Act follows a general trend in other jurisdictions to uphold legislatively imposed liability on corporate officers. 8 Generally, statutes imposing liability
upon corporate officers have been upheld where the statute is given a reasonable and fair interpretation in light of the legislative intent.3
The expansion toward personal accountability of corporate officers will
undoubtedly be accompanied by problems and benefits. Businesses, for example, may need to extend insurance coverage for officers and directors to
cover claims against the wrongful acts of the corporation. This of course will
result in increased business costs which ultimately must be borne by the consumer. The legislatively imposed personal liability on corporate officers may
induce increased corporate involvement in the political sphere. Overshadowing the present concerns and costs to business, however, is the positive, long" 297 S.E.2d at 872.
soId.
31 Id.

3 Id.
33

Id.

4Id.

SId.
See Royer v. Maib, 6 Wash. 2d 286, 107 P.2d 335 (1940); Sheffield v. Nobles, 378 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1964); Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979); Security
Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1977); National
Resources, Inc. v. Wineburg, 349 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966).
See State ex rel. Haden v. Calco Awning and Window Corp., 153 W. Va. 524, 170 S.E.2d
362 (1969).
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term effects of increased corporate accountability. Directors and officers will
be more inclined to take affirmative action to prevent and correct violations
of laws and regulations. As a result, the livelihoods of workers will be better
protected pursuant to the Wage Payment and Collection Act and its interpretation by the court. Corporations will benefit, as directors and officers
will need to restructure avenues within the corporate system for the flow of
vital information concerning liabilities of both the corporation and the directors and officers themselves.Providing employees with the ability to sue corporate officers in their
personal capacity does not seem likely to encourage increased litigation. Violation of the Wage Payment and Collection Act provided for employee suits
against employers to recover wrongfully withheld wages and fringe benefits
prior to the Mullins decision. 9 The court's decision in Mullins provides employees with another avenue to collect wrongfully withheld compensation by
placing the liability upon the officers of the corporation who have the intent,
"knowingly," to permit corporate violations of the Act."
II.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS

Morris v. Marshall, 305 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1983).
ClendeninLumber and Supply Co. v. Carpenter,305 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1983).
Corte Company v. County Commission, 299 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1982).
In the case of Morris v. Marshall,"'the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals addressed several issues relating to (1) supervised lenders and consumer loans pursuant to the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act," (2) actions constituting "the banking business" in West Virginia, and (3)
homestead exemptions pursuant the West Virginia Code."3
Appellants, Ralph and Helen Morris, appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals after a circuit court refused to grant a permanent injunction to prevent a trustee's foreclosure sale on their real property." The
real estate had been pledged as security for several loans issued to the appellants to finance their corporation, A.C. Morris Garage, Inc." The corporation
was in the business of buying and selling used cars and trucks, but eventually
became defunct after a variety of problems arose. The loans in default, totalSee Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers for Debts of Financially Troubled Corporations, 81 Com. L.J. 389 (1976).
W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -16 (1981).
'5 297 S.E.2d at 869-70.
" 305 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1983).
42 W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-1-101 to -107 (1980).
W. VA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -6 (Supp. 1983).
305 S.E.2d at 582.
'5

Id.

4O Id.
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ing $234,731.92, were obtained in part from Ashland Finance Company, a
Kentucky corporation, and from Ashland Finance Company of West Virginia,
a subsidiary of the Kentucky corporation."'
The appellants advanced four arguments for consideration on appeal in
support of their request for a permanent injunction: First, that Ashland Finance Company of West Virginia was a supervised lender under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act;48 second, that Ashland Finance
Company of West Virginia was solely a supervised lender;4" third, that Ashland Finance Company of Kentucky acted as an unauthorized bank when
making loans;5 0 and fourth, that a homestead exemption in West Virginia can
prevent the sale of real estate under a deed of trust." The court failed to
agree with any of5 2appellants' arguments and ultimately affirmed the holding
of the trial court
First, appellants asserted that Ashland Finance Company of West Virginia was a supervised lender under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act.53 Based on this contention, the appellants claimed to be protected under the Act. They sought "to void the loans based on W. Va. Code,
46A-5-101(2),rl or to claim excessive interest charges under W. Va. Code,
46A-4-111Pl or [claim] improper acquisition df a deed of trust under W. Va.
6
Code, 46A-4-109()[ r' 57
The court examined the definitions of "supervised lender '", and "supervised loan" 59 as provided in the Act and determined that in order to be a

17

Id. at 582-83.

,' Id. at 583.
4 Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
'

Id. at 586.

2

Id. at 588.

" Id. at 583; W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(44) (1983) defines "[s]upervised lender" as "a person
authorized to make or take assignments of supervised loans."
, W. VA. CODE § 46A-5-101(2) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
If a creditor has violated the provisions of this chapter respecting authority to make
supervised loans (§ 46A-4-101), the loan is void and the consumer is not obligated to pay
either principal or the loan finance charge.
I The applicable provision of W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-111 (Supp. 1983) reads:
No licensee shall .

.

. charge .

.

. greater than six percent per annum upon the loan

when the amount or value thereof is more than sixteen hundred dollars.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-109(1) (Supp. 1983) states in pertinent part:
A supervised lender may not contract for an interest in land as security. A security in...

terest taken in violation of this subsection is void . . .

, 305 S.E.2d at 584.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(44) (1983).
5, W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(45) (Supp. 1983) provides:
"Supervised loan" means a consumer loan made by other than a supervised financial
organization, including a loan made pursuant to revolving loan account, where the prin-
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supervised lender, one must grant "consumer loans."6 To determine what
constitutes a "consumer loan" the court then examined the definition of "consumer loan" pursuant to West Virginia Code section 46A-1-102(14)" and
several cases from other jurisdictions6 2 which had statutory definitions of
"consumer loan" similar or identical to that of West Virginia.63 One recurring
proposition was found throughout the cases: if a loan was made in pursuit of a
commercial venture, it was not a consumer loan. The court adopted this limitation and held that loans made for commercial purposes, such as the appellants' loan to finance their automobile dealership, "are not 'consumer loans'
within the purview of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act.""
The court refused to address appellants' second argument that "Ashland
Finance Company of West Virginia was only a supervised lender .

.

. and,

therefore, could not have made commercial loans."6 This refusal was based
upon the court's prior determination that the appellants' loan was not a consumer loan, along with the undeveloped factual record concerning the finance
company.6
Third, the appellants argued that the Kentucky lending institution acted
as an unauthorized bank when making loans.' The appellants hoped to enjoin
Ashland Finance Company of Kentucky from collecting its loans for failure to
comply with West Virginia banking law." The court, however, refused to
adopt the appellants' position. Since neither the definitions of bank, banking
institution, and banking business, 9 nor the banking powers elicited under the
cipal does not exceed two thousand dollars, and in which the rate of the loan finance
charge exceeds eight percent per year as determined according to the actuarial method.
(emphasis supplied).
305 S.E.2d at 583.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(14) (Supp. 1983) provides: "Consumer loan" is a loan made by a
person regularly engaged in the business of making loans in which:
(a) The debtor is a person other than an organization;
(b) The debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural purpose;
(c) Either the debt is payable in installments or a loan finance charge is made; and
(d) Either the principal does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars or the debt is secured by
an interest in land.
"ZHall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977); Stricklin v. Investors Syndicate Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 391 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014 (Okla. 1976); United Kan. Bank & Trust Co. v. Rixner, 4 Kan. App. 2d 662, 610
P.2d 116 (1980), aff'd, 228 Kan. 633, 619 P.2d 1156.
305 S.E.2d at 583-84.

Id. at 584.
65

Id.

Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586; W. VA. CODE §§ 31A-1-1 to 31A-8B-5 (1982).
W. VA. CODE § 31A-1-2(b) - (c)(Supp. 1983) provides:
W
(b) The words "bank" and "banking institution" mean a corporation heretofore or
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West Virginia banking statutes"0 defined which, if any, of the many functions
of banks constitutes "the banking business," the court followed the general
rule that a fundamental function of the banking business is the receipt and
payment of deposits." Since Ashland Finance Company of Kentucky was a
private corporation which did not have depositors, but instead loaned monies
from its own assets, the court held that the lending of money alone from a
corporation's own assets did not constitute banking.7"
Finally, the appellants asserted their rights to a homestead exemption73
in support of a permanent injunction enjoining the sale of their real estate.
The court noted that a homestead exemption automatically arises by operation of law and that it is subject to the provision of the West Virginia Constitution"' which exempts a homestead, up to $5,000 in value, from forced
sale. 75 The court emphasized that the Legislature retained the "exempt from
forced sale" language when this section of the constitution was altered and
hereafter chartered to conduct a banking business under the laws of West Virginia or an
association heretofore or hereafter authorized to conduct a banking business in West
Virginia under the laws of the United States and having its principal office in this State
and shall embrace and include a trust company or an institution combining banking and
trust company facilities, functions and services so chartered or authorized to conduct
such business in this State, and shall include industrial banks authorized by article
seven [§ 31-7-1 et seq.], chapter thirty-one of this Code, subject to the limitations therein
imposed on such industrial banks and further subject to the limitations imposed thereon
in this article;
(c) The term "banking business" means the functions, services and activities contained,
detailed and embraced in sections thirteen and fourteen [§§ 31A-4-13 and 31A-4-14], article four of this chapter and as elsewhere defined by law ....
7 W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-13 (Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part:
Any banking institution ...shall have the right to buy or discount promissory notes and
bonds, negotiate drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of indebtedness, borrow
money, receive deposits on such terms and conditions as its officers may prescribe, buy
and sell exchange, bank notes, bullion or coin, loan money on personal or other security,
rent safe-deposit boxes and receive on deposit, for safekeeping, jewelry, plate, stocks,
bonds and personal property of whatsoever description and provide customer services
incidental to the business of banking, including but not limited to the issuance and servicing of and lending money by means of credit cards as letters of credit or otherwise.
Any banking institution may accept, for payment at a future date ....
drafts drawn upon
it by its customers ....
71 305 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting Warren v. Shook, 91 U.S. 704, 710 (1875)) ("Having a place of
business where deposits are received and paid out on checks, and where money is loaned upon
security, is the substance of the business of a banker.").
7'305 S.E.2d at 586. Accord, Oregon & W. Trust Inv. Co. v. Rathburn, 18 F. Cas. 764 (No.
10,555) (C.C.D. Ore. 1877); Meserole Sec. Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519 (1930).
W. VA.-CODE § 38-9-1 to -6 (Supp. 1983).
7,W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48 provides in part that "[a]ny husband or parent, residing in this
State, or the infant children of deceased parents, may hold a homestead of the value of five thousand dollars, and personal property to the value of one thousand dollars, exempt from forced
sale ......
' 305 S.E.2d at 587.
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subsequently amended by voter ratification in 1973.76 The court found the retained language to be significant, especially in light of the court's previous
holding in the case of Moran v. Clark.7"
In Moran, the court held that a sale of a homestead under deed of trust or
a decree of mortgage foreclosure was not a forced sale within the purview of
the state constitution. 8 The court in Morris interpreted the legislature's retention of "exempt from forced sale" as evidencing an intent to reaffirm the
Moran holding. Thus, the court denied the homestead exemption claim by appellants, stating "a sale under a deed of trust is not a forced sale under Sec'
tion 48 of Article VI of our [West Virginia] Constitution."79
In Clendenin Lumber and Supply Co., Inc. v. Carpenter," the supreme
court of appeals reasserted the fundamental principle that a motion for summary judgment should only be granted when there is no genuine issue of fact
to be tried, and in doing so interpreted two statutory provisions of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act 8' and the West Virginia Wage
Payment and Collection Act.2 As illustrated in the court's prior interpretation of the Wage Payment and Collection Act in Mullins v. Venable,8 the
court again protected the interests of the wage earner over those of the employer. In Clendenin the court held a payroll deduction agreement between

"Id.
' 30 W. Va. 358, 4 S.E. 303 (1887).
7IId.
' 305 S.E.2d at 588.
305 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1983).
8 W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116(2)(b) (1980) provides:
"Assignment of earnings" includes all forms of assignments, deductions, transfers, or
sales of earnings to another, either as payment or as security, and whether stated to be
revocable or nonrevocable, and includes any deductions authorized under the provisions
of section three [§ 21-5-3], article five, chapter twenty-one of this Code, except deductions for union or club dues, pension plans, payroll savings plans, charities, stock purchase plans and hospitalization and medical insurance. (emphasis supplied).
" W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
No assignment of or order for future wages shall be valid for a period exceeding one
year from the date of such assignment or order. Such assignment or order shall be
acknowledged by the party making the same before a notary public or other officer
authorized to take acknowledgements, and such order or assignment shall specify
thereon the total amount due and collectible by virtue of the same and three fourths of
the periodical earnings or wages of the assignor shall at all times be exempt from such
assignment or order and no assignment or order shall be valid which does not so state
upon its face: Provided further, that no such order or assignment shall be valid unless
the written acceptance of the employer of the assignor to the making thereof, is endorsed thereon: Provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the right of employer and employees to agree between themselves as to deductions to be made from the payroll of employees ....
' 297 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1982) (discussed supra).
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employer and employee an invalid
assignment of earnings pursuant to the ap84
plicable statutory provisions.
Following an adverse judgment in circuit court, the appellant in Clendenin raised two issues of error on appeal. Both issues of error resulted from
the trial court's ruling that both as a matter of law and fact (1) there had been
no assignment of earnings between the appellant, Carpenter, and the appellee, Clendenin Lumber and Supply Company, and (2) that the credit extended to appellant Carpenter by appellee was not part of an open-end credit
plan.Appellant Carpenter was employed by Clendenin Lumber and Supply
Company. On several occasions he charged goods that he had purchased from
Clendenin under a company policy extending credit to Clendenin employees."
Carpenter made irregular payments on the credit balance, and, at one point,
made no payments at all for an approximate nine month period.87 Subsequently, pursuant to an agreement with Clendenin, Carpenter signed an authorization for Clendenin to deduct thirty dollars per pay period from his
wages, to be credited to the balance on his account.8 After eight consecutive
payroll deductions, Carpenter ceased his employment with Clendenin, leaving an unpaid credit balance of $689.90.8 Clendenin thereafter instituted an
action to collect the outstanding credit balance plus interest and costs.8
In appealing the adverse judgment of the circuit court, appellant Carpenter asserted two major arguments. First, he argued that his agreement
with Clendenin for the deduction of thirty dollars each pay period was an assignment of earnings pursuant to the West Virginia Code,9 and as such, was
in violation of the form requirements for a valid assignment of earnings as
set forth in the Wage Payment and Collection Act. 2 Additionally, Carpenter
asserted that his agreement with Clendenin was not exempt from the form
requirements of West Virginia Code section 21-5-3 as a deduction, 9 since the
Wage Payment and Collection Act specifically limits deductions to those de-

305 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 333.
" Id. at 334.
SId.
SId.
91Id.
91 W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116(2)(b) (1980).
W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1981).
The applicable provision of W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1981) reads:
IN]othing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the right of employer and
employees to agree between themselves as to deductions to be made from the payroll of
employees ....
'
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fined in the Act. 94 Appellee Clendenin, on the other hand, argued that the
agreement was not an assignment, since the thirty dollars per pay period
taken from Carpenter's earnings was not transferred "to another" as an assignment is defined in the Act,95 but was paid to itself.9"
The court went through a three-part analysis to resolve the first issue regarding whether or not the agreement between Carpenter and Clendenin
was an assignment of earnings under the Act provisions. First, following
well-established precedent in West Virginia,' the court read the two statutes
in parimatera." In construing these statutes together, the court found a concurring protective function. The court's opinion, written by Justice McHugh,
emphasized the legislative intent behind the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act, which is to protect consumers of credit,99 and its consistency with the purpose behind the enactment of the West Virginia Wage
Payment and Collection Act, which is to "protect working people and assist
them in collection of compensation wrongly withheld." ' With these considerations in mind, the court held that it would be inconsistant with the protective functions of the Acts to exempt employers from the provisions of
both Acts."'
Second, as additional support to impose the Acts' restrictions upon
employers, the court found that it was the Legislature's intent to impose the
restrictions upon employers." 2 The court found this legislative intent
evidenced by use of the word "deductions" throughout the statutes, and the
similarity of the definitions of "deductions" in both statutes. Deductions, as
defined in both statutes, included general employer/employee matters."3 As

W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(g) (1981) provides:
The term "deductions" includes amounts required by law to be withheld, and amounts
authorized for union or club dues, pension plans, payroll saving plans, credit unions,
charities and hospitalization and medical insurance.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116(2)(b) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
"Assignment of earnings" includes all forms of assignments, deductions, transfers, or
sales of earnings to another .... (emphasis added).
305 S.E.2d at 336.
, Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238, 243 (W. Va. 1981) ("[W]hen two statutes relate
to the same general subject and ... are not in conflict, they are to be read in pari materia.");Tug
Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. County Comm'n, 261 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1979); State ex rel. Miller
v. Locke, 253 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1979); Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d
321 (W. Va. 1978).
" 305 S.E.2d at 336.
See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978); Cardi, The
West Virginia Consumer Credit and ProtectionAct, 77 W. VA. L. REv.401 (1975).
" Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 869 (W. Va. 1982) (emphasis supplied).
...
305 S.E.2d at 337.
102Id.
103 Id.
"
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defined by the Wage Payment and Collection Act, deductions include those
specific deductions enumerated within the statutory definition, such as union
and credit dues, pension plans, and medical insurance, plus those deductions
required by law." ' The Consumer Credit and Protection Act provides similar
0 5
language in defining deductions."
Having determined that employers are subject to the provisions of the
Acts, the court turned to the third part of its analysis to determine whether
the agreement between Carpenter and Clendenin was a type of deduction
which was exempt from the requirements of West Virginia Code section
21-5-3."'0 The final provision of section 21-5-3 states that the form requirements therein will not affect the right of employer and employee to
agree between themselves as to deductions to be made from the payroll of
the employee.' The court took a very restrictive view of this provision, concentrating on the word "deductions." Reasserting its earlier analysis of
"deductions," the court held it only applied to the specifically enumerated
categories in the statutory definition of "deductions" or those required by
law.0 8 Since the agreement between Carpenter and Clendenin was not an exempted type, described by the statutory definitions, the court held that the
agreement must meet the form requirements of section 21-5-3.19 These form
requirements require that an assignment (1) not extend beyond one year,
(2) be notarized, (3) specify the total amount due, (4) state that three-fourths
of the wages are exempt from assignment, and (5) contain a written acceptance by the employer. "
Following the conclusions from its three point analysis, the court rejected Clendenin's argument and held that the phrase "to another," as used
in West Virginia Code section 46A-2-116(2)(b) "includes an employer when
that employer is also the creditor of the employee."'0 Thus, the court found
the agreement between appellant and Clendenin to be assignment of wages
which must adhere to the form requirements of West Virginia Code section
21-5-3.12 When viewed in light of the five form requirements set forth in section 21-5-3,"' the court found the assignment between Clendenin and

I Id.; W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(g) (1981) lists the specific deductions as "union or club dues, pension plans, payroll savings plans, credit unions, charities and hospitalization and medical insurance."
1o5
305 S.E.2d at 337; see W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116(2)(b) (1980).
305 S.E.2d at 337.
107 W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1981).
10 305 S.E.2d at 337.
119Id.; W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1979).
110 W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1979).

.. 305 S.E.2d at 338.

Id.
The five form requirements are that the assignment shall:
(1) not extend beyond one year;
112

"'
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Carpenter lacking in all the requirements, and therefore the assignment was
void."'
Appellant's second major argument of error in Clendenin was based upon
the trial court ruling both as a matter of law and fact that the credit extended by Clendenin was not part of an open-end credit plan pursuant to the
Truth in Lending Act"' and Regulation Z.111 Treating the trial court's ruling
as one for summary judgment, the court reviewed the record of the case
closely to determine if there was a genuine issue as to any material fact
regarding the credit relationship between appellant and Clendenin. Contrary
to the trial court's ruling, the court found several factual issues in conflict.
Although Clendenin asserted that its credit policy did not permit installment
payments, the record showed that the appellant made several such
payments."' In addition, credit memoranda issued by Clendenin seemed to
contradict sworn statements by the general manager of Clendenin concerning the regular terms of its credit."' Finally, the billing practices of
Clendenin indicated that a debtor could defer an outstanding credit balance
until the next billing period simply by assuming a monthly finance charge.'
Based upon these conflicting issues of fact the court concluded that there
was a genuine issue as to the credit relationship existing between appellant
Carpenter and his employer, Clendenin Lumber and Supply Company. 20
Thus, the court followed the well-established general principle that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there
is not genuine issue of fact to be tried,' ' 21 and reversed the trial court's
order.'2
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Id.

be notarized;
specify the total amount due;
state that three fourths of the wages are exempt from assignment;
contain a written acceptance by the employer.

114Id.

'Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677e (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Purpose is to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that a consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available and avoid uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer regarding
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices. Open End Credit plan means a plan
under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions, prescribes terms of
transactions and provides for a finance charge on the outstanding balance.).
"a 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1983) (Issued to implement the federal Truth in Lending and Fair
Credit Billing Acts. Its purpose is "to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring
disclosure about its terms and costs.").
"' 305 S.E.2d at 339.
"'

Id.
Id. at 33940.

in Id. at 340.
222

Perlick & Co. v. Lakeview Creditor's Trustee Comm., 298 S.E.2d 228, 232 (W. Va. 1982);

Karnell v. Nutting, 273 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1980); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
1" 305 S.E.2d at 340.
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In deciding Corte Company v. County Commission,"' the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals followed the generally held rule that "if a
municipality wrongfully receives, holds, diverts, or disposes of ...money or
property ...it becomes liable for interest for the period covered by the
wrong .... "124 The court's heavy reliance upon fault analysis tempered its
general holding that county commissions may be liable in contract actions for
interest pursuant to provisions of the West Virginia Code."2 5
Corte Company, Inc. appealed the lower court's denial of prejudgment interest on a contractual debt owed by the appellee, County Commission of
McDowell County.128 Pursuant to a contract with the County Commission,
Corte had performed certain remodeling work. Upon completion of the work,
an unpaid balance of $32,555.75 remained outstanding. The County Commission admitted that it owed the unpaid balance, but asserted that the nonpayment was through no fault of its own. The remodeling had been funded
through money from the United States government. The final installment
was still forthcoming. 1 Approximately seven months after completion of the
remodeling, the County Commission received the federal monies and paid the
appellant the principal amount, but with no interest." The appellant argued
that it should receive interest on the late payment pursuant to West Virginia
Code section 56-6-27.129
To determine if the code section applied to county commissions as well as
to private litigants, the court first reviewed the general trend of its past decisions 3 ' removing county commissions and local boards of education from
beneath the umbrella of state constitutional immunity from suit. 3 ' The court
emphasized that it had not distinquished between actions based upon contract and those founded in tort when holding that boards of education do not
have state constitutional immunity nor common law governmental immunity
299 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1982).
,z'
56 AM. JuR. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions § 836
(1971).
1" W. VA. CODE § 56-6-27 (1966 & Supp. 1983) provides:
The jury, in any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the principal due, or
any part thereof, and in all cases they shall find the aggregate of principal and interest
due at the time of the trial, after allowing all proper credits, payments and sets-off; and
judgment shall be entered for such aggregate with interest from the date of the verdict.
...
299 S.E.2d at 17.
I2
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
' See Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982) (consolidated
contract and tort actions in which the court stated that local boards of education do not have state
constitutional nor common law government immunity from suits); Boggs v. Board of Educ., 244
S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1978), overruled, 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982) (tort action in which court held
County Commissions not within the state constitutional immunity from suit).
"' 299 S.E.2d at 18.
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from suit.132 From this review the court decided that there was also no basis
for distinguishing between actions founded upon contract and those founded
upon tort when deciding whether a county commission is immune from suit.,3
Second, the opinion pointed out that in West Virginia county commissions
have long been liable for breaches of valid contracts.'34 The court, therefore,
agreed with the appellant, holding that county commissions are subject to
the provisions of West Virginia Code section 56-6-27, and consequently may
be liable for interest on contractual debts."
The opinion, written by Justice McHugh, did not stop with this conclusion, but went on to consider the concept of fault as it relates to interest paid
on contractual debts by municipal corporations. 3 Looking first to past precedent in West Virginia, the court found that relying exclusively upon fault
analysis, without any reference to section 56-6-27 of the West Virginia Code,
a municipal corporation was adjudged liable for post-judgment interest
where it had been partly responsible for the injury of the plaintiff.'37 The
court also looked at the national trend, finding that generally, even in the
absence of statute, municipal corporations have been held liable for interest
where they wrongfully receive, hold, divert, or dispose of money or
property. 3
Turning back to the facts in Corte Company, the court outlined a two
step procedure for determining the issue of fault. The court first held that
fault depended upon two possible acts by the McDowell County Commission:
(1) failure to make a reasonable effort to secure final payment from the
federal government; or (2) the occurrence of an unreasonable delay in payment after receipt of the funds. The court indicated that if either of the
foregoing acts is demonstrated, then the county commission had wrongfulling
withheld the funds and was at fault.' 9 If neither of those two acts is found,
however, the County Commission may still not be free from all liability and
the analysis proceeds to step two. Step two depends upon the contractor's
knowledge as to the source of the funding for the project.4 ' If Corte knew
that the funds would have to be received from the federal government before
he could be paid, then ideas of equity and fairness would prevent the court

13

Id.; Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982).

'

299 S.E.2d at 18.

134

Id.

'1 Id. at 19.
13 Id.

137Lockard v. City of Salem, 130 W. Va. 287, 435 S.E.2d 239 (1947), rev'g Lockard v. City of
Salem, 127 W. Va. 237, 32 S.E.2d 568 (1944).
11 299 S.E.2d at 19; 56 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 836 (1971).
299 S.E.2d at 20.
,,o Id.

'

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 15
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

from penalizing the McDowell County Commission for the federal government's tardiness."
In summary, the court held:
When a contract is entered into between a county commission and a contractor for certain construction work, and the contractor knew, or had reason to
believe, that funds from the federal government would be used for such work,
then the contractor may not recover interest on the amount owed by the
county commission if a delay in payment from the federal government occurs,
provided that the county commission makes a reasonable effort to insure that
payment of the debt will be made in a timely manner. 2
The case was then remanded to fully develop the facts needed for the fault
analysis."'
III.

SUGGESTEE EXECUTION

AFC Industries, Inc. v. Credithrift of America, Inc., No. 15595 (W. Va. Mar.
10, 1983).
In the factual circumstances leading to the case of AFC Industries,Inc. v.
Credithriftof America, Inc., the appellee, Credithrift of America, sought to
execute a judgment it had obtained against the appellants, Mr. and Mrs.
Jackie E. Stewart, by issuing a suggestee execution'45 against Mr. Stewart's
wages. Appellant Stewart, in response to the execution, sought to exempt
$1,000.00 of his wages pursuant to West Virginia Code section 38-8-1.4 In
compliance with the personal property exemption requirement of this
statute, AFC Industries excluded the first $1,000.00 of the appellant's full
salary, thereafter withholding a portion of his wages under the suggestee ex-

141Id.
142 Id.

143 Id.

,

No. 15595 (W. Va. Mar. 10, 1983).
W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-3 (Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part:
A judgment creditor may apply to the court ... for a suggestee execution against any
money due or to become due within one year after the issuance of such execution to the
judgment debtor as salary or wages arising out of any private employment ... the execution and expenses thereof shall become a lien and continuing levy upon the salary or
wages ... to an amount equal to twenty per centum thereof and no more, but in no
event shall the payments ... reduce the amount payable to the judgment debtor to an
amount per, week that is less than thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage then in
effect.
,, The applicable provision of W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1983) reads:
Any husband, wife, parent or other head of household residing in this State, . . . may set
apart and hold personal property not exceeding one thousand dollars in value to be exempt from execution or other process....
"
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ecution.147 Upon Stewart's objection to this withholding, AFC Industries filed

an interpleader action in circuit court.'
In the lower court Stewart argued that the $1,000.00 exemption should
apply only to that portion of his wages which could be attached by suggestee

execution.'

Credithrift asserted that the statutory $1,000.00 exemption ap-

plied to the debtor's total wages." The circuit court read the code sections"'
in pari materia and held the exemption applied to the debtor's full salary or
wages after deductions for state and federal taxes."'

On appeal, Justice Neely, writing for the majority, found AFC Industries,
Inc. a case of first impression."' The court emphasized that the case turned

upon the proper interpretation of West Virginia Code section 38-5A-9.'" This
code section applies the $1,000.00 statutory exemption of section 38-8-1 to
levies against the wages or salary of a debtor. Ordinarily, the exemption is

applied to the personal property of the debtor."'
The court illustrated that under the appellant's interpretation of the

statutes, if a debtor chooses to apply the exemption to personal property or,
for example, cash in a bank account, the debtor is limited to a $1,000.00 exemption. However, if the debtor chooses to apply the exemption to wages or
salary, and if it can only be applied, as argued by the appellant, to the twenty
percent which can be attached by suggestee execution, the $1,000.00 exemption increases to a $5,000.00 exemption."8
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals followed the traditional

"I By suggestee execution, pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-3 (Supp. 1983), a judgment
creditor may either attach up to 20% of a debtor's wages or the amount of the debtor's wages in
excess of 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage, whichever is greater.
,, No. 15595, slip op. at 4 (W. Va. Mar. 10, 1983).
"

Id. at 1.

Id. at 2.
W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-1 to -13 (1966 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1983).
No. 15595, slip op. at 4.
Id.
I3
" Id.; W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 (1966) provides:
A judgment debtor to whom money is due or to become due which would otherwise be
subject to suggestion under this article may have the same exempted from levy in the
manner and to the extent provided for by article eight [§ 38-8-1 et. seq.] of this chapter.
The exemption may be claimed for sums currently accruing but must be asserted anew
as to any salary or wages which shall begin to accrue after the next payment date. Such
exemption shall not be binding upon a suggestee unless and until a certificate of exemption or true copy thereof shall have been delivered to him.
'5 The pertinent part of W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 reads: "[any] head of a household ... may set
apart and hold personal property not exceeding one thousand dollars in value to be exempt from
execution.... (emphasis supplied).
"'

AFC Indus., No. 15595, slip op. at 5.
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cardinal rule for construing exemption statutes.15 First and foremost, the
court must ascertain the intent of the Legislature, and see that this intent is
carried out.'58 Relying upon the explicit wording of West Virginia Code section 38-5A-9,1" the court found that the result suggested by the appellant was
not intended by the legislature. First, in drafting the statute, the Legislature
did not limit the exemption of money just from suggestee execution, but from
all levy. " Second, the statute specifically provided that the exemption should
be "in the manner and to the extent provided for by Article 8 [§ 38-8-1 et seq.]
of this chapter."'61
Therefore, the court affirmed the holding of the circuit court, and stated:
[T]he Legislature intended for a debtor to be able to protect the first thousand
dollars of money owed to him from any process of execution whatsoever, but
that once his or her thousand dollar exemption had been exhausted, all subsequent money would be liable to suggestee execution to the extent authorized
by Code, 38-5A-3 [19791.162
The $1,000.00 debtor's exemption applied against the appellant's actual
salary due, not against only that portion of his salary which was determined
to be subject to suggestee execution.
IV.

CONTRACTS

Baker Mine Service, Inc. v. Nutter, 301 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals joined the modern weight
of authority favoring arbitration over litigation in the 1977 case of Board of
Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.' At that time the court espoused a rule
of law whereby arbitration provisions which have been bargained for by parties to a contract would be held binding and strictly enforceable. 4 In so
holding the court overruled all prior inconsistent West Virginia cases.'6 ' The
66
per curiam holding in Baker Mine Service, Inc. v. Nutter"
reaffirmed the

...
See Usery v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Brown, 32
Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972); In re Dolard, 275 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Calif. 1967); South
Hill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hudson, 174 Va. 284, 6 S.E.2d 668 (1940).
" A cardinal rule of construing exemption laws generally shown in the case law is that the
intention of the lawmaker must prevail over the literal sense of the terms. 35 C.J.S. Exemptions
§ 4 (1960).
"'

W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 (1966).

W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 (1966) provides in pertinent part: "A judgment debtor to whom
money is due or to become due ... may have the same exempted from levy ....(emphasis added).
"' No. 15595, slip op. at 5, 6; W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 (1966).
,12No. 15595, slip op. at 6.
16 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977).
15

1

Id. at 447.

Id. at 448.
301 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
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court's continued preference for the speedy and economical conflict resolution of arbitration over the often expensive, formal, and time consuming
judicial proceeding."7
The parties in Baker Mine Service, Inc., entered into a sales contract consisting of three documents: a plan of re-organization and merger, an escrow
68
Both the plan and the escrow
agreement, and a covenant not to compete."
agreement contained arbitration clauses. The plan provided that "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Plan or Escrow Agreement, or this breach of the Plan or Escrow Agreement shall be settled by arbitration."'69 In a section entitled "Arbitration Exclusive Remedy," the
escrow agreement provided that the sellers could only dispute any setoffs7 °or
retentions in the escrow stock by "initiating an arbitration proceeding."'
Petitioner-buyer, Baker International Corporation, retained portions of
escrow stock which were to be distributed to the respondent-seller, Daniel
Minnix. 7' This retention was due to alleged breaches of the respondent's
fiduciary duty to Baker Mine Services.' The respondent filed a civil action in
circuit court to settle the dispute, asserting that the notification of retention
sent by Baker International occurred after the termination date provided by
the plan for such claims.' The petitioners maintained that respondent should
be prohibited from proceeding with the civil action, arguing that the dispute
should be settled by arbitration as provided for in the contract.7 The trial
court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss, and the petitioners appealed.
Noting that parties to a contract can narrow the scope of arbitration
agreements by limiting them to specific subjects or particular time periods,
the court stressed that the parties in this case did not specifically limit the
arbitration agreement. Instead, the contract between the parties expressly
provided that arbitration would be the exclusive remedy to settle their
disputes.' Following its own precedent, 76 the court reviewed the entire written contract, finding that the parties bargained for and intended to arbitrate.
their differences, rather than subject their differences to litigation, as ex-

167236

S.E.2d at 442; 5 AM.

JUR.

2d Arbitration and Award § 1 (1962).

301 S.E.2d at 861.
167 Id.
at 862.
16

17'

Id.

171
172

Id.

173
'
'7'

Id.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.

176"Where parties to a contract agree to arbitrate either all disputes or particular limited
disputes arising under the contract, and where the parties bargained for the arbitration provision,
then, arbitration is mandatory ... " Board of Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 447
(W.Va. 1977).
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pressed by the broad language of the arbitration provisions. 117 Furthermore,
the court re-asserted the general rule it adopted in State ex rel Ranger Fuel
7 8
that "the duty to arbitrate under an arbitration clause in a contract
v. Lilly"
survives the termination of the contract."'7 Thus, a writ of prohibition was
awarded by the court, and the respondent was prevented from proceeding
with the civil action until the dispute had been arbitrated as provided for
under the contract provisions.110
Linda Rae Artimez

17 301 S.E.2d at 862.
178State ex rel. Ranger Fuel v. Lilly, 267 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1980) (per curiam).

301 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting Ranger Fuel, 267 S.E.2d at 437).
/d.
I8
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